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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Santos Tena appeals from the judgment and conviction entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance, claiming
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Tena's conviction for possession of methamphetamine is based on the
following account from the presentence report ("PSI"):
On April 27, 2011, at approximately 0725 hours, Deputy Bernad
was dispatched to 491 E Hwy 81 to serve to [sic] warrants on
Santos Tena, one from Cassia County and one from Twin Falls
County. Dispatch advised that Veronica Tena reported Santos was
staying at that address and that his father thought people were
bringing him drugs.
Deputy Bemad and Deputy Garrett arrived and made contact with
Revecca Tena, mother of Santos Tena. When asked whether
Santos was in the home, she pointed down the stairs and said that
he was asleep. She called down to him and he came to the bottom
of the stairs arguing with her. Deputies then went to the bottom of
the stairs and advised Santos he was under arrest. ...
Deputy Bemad spoke with Mrs. Tena and she signed a consent to
search form for the residence. Upon entering Santos' room,
Deputy Bemad noticed a baggie containing a white crystal
substance, in plain view. The baggie was on the couch cushion,
along with a pocket knife, and the substance inside the baggie later
presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine. On the floor in
front of the couch, Deputy Bernad observed something wrapped in
a blue paper towel. The item was found to be a pipe with a burnt
brown residue. Deputy Bernad also located a coin purse containing
a glass pipe and five small Ziploc baggies between the cushion and
the arm rest of the couch.
(PSI, p.3.)
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The state charged Tena with felony possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine or amphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia, and
alleged he was a persistent violator.

(R., pp.74-76.)

Tena filed a motion to

suppress. 1 After a hearing and the submission of briefs, the district court denied
Tena's motion, ruling that the search of his bedroom was legal because his
mother consented to the search and had apparent authority to do so. (Tr., pp.97118.) Tena entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the
denial of his suppression motion. (R., pp.127-141.) The district court imposed a
unified seven-year sentence with one year fixed. (R., pp.159-162.) Tena filed a
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.165-167.)

According to the district court, Tena filed his suppression motion on December
6, 2011 (Tr., p.5, Ls.8-10), however, that motion has not been included in the
record on appeal.
1

2

ISSUE

Tena states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tena's motion to
suppress, because Ms. Tena did not have authority to consent to
the search of his bedroom?
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Tena failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT

Tena Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Tena challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that his

mother did not have apparent or actual authority to consent to the search of his
bedroom. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-20.) Contrary to Tena's argument, the district
court correctly concluded that the search was constitutionally valid because
Tena's mother had the apparent authority to consent to such a search.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006); State v. Barker, 136
Idaho 278,280,40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002); State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736,738,85
P.3d 1135, 1137 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 346-47, 2 P.3d
153, 155-56 (Ct. App. 2000).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying
Tena's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of an individual's

home absent certain limited exceptions. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181
(1990). One clearly recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent
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from an individual who has actual or apparent authority to submit to the search.
State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,219,984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). Where it is later
established that a third party who consented to a search lacked actual authority
to consent, the search may still be upheld if the law enforcement officers
reasonably believed that actual authority existed. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89;
Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219,984 P.2d at 707. "The key to the apparent authority
exception to the warrant requirement is the concept of reasonableness." Brauch,
133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707, citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-88.
Officers must have an objectively reasonable belief that the person giving
consent has the authority to do so. That is, the determination must "be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment ... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the consenting
party had authority over the premises?"

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Therefore, to assess whether apparent
authority exists, "one must look for indicia of actual authority." United States v.
Rosario, 962 F.2d 733, 737
F.2d 129, 134

(ih Cir. 1992) (quoting United States

V.

Miller, 800

(ih Cir. 1986)).

The district court denied Tena's suppression motion, concluding that the
deputies reasonably believed Ms. Tena had actual authority to consent to a
search of her home and Tena's bedroom, explaining (with bracketed citations to
suppression hearing testimony):
The gravamen of the Defendant's argument is that Ms. Tena
lacked the authority to consent to the search of the Defendant's
bedroom in her house because he was paying rent. However,
regardless of whether Ms. Tena had actual authority to consent to
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the search of the Defendant's bedroom, she had apparent authority
to do so.
At the time the officers secured Ms. Tena's consent and
searched the Defendant's bedroom they were aware of several
relevant circumstances. The residence belonged to Ms. Tena and
her husband. [Tr., p.?, L.23 - p.8, L.4.] Ms. Tena told the officers
that she had access to the house. [Tr., p.33, Ls.12-13.] There was
no evidence that the Defendant had a key to his bedroom door; that
he used the old skeleton key lock to prevent access to his
bedroom; that the Defendant used a more modern lock on his
bedroom door; or that the Defendant had the ability to exclude his
parents from his bedroom. [Tr., p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.6.] Ms. Tena's
statement that she did the Defendant's laundry and took meals to
him in his bedroom gives rise to a reasonable inference that the
Defendant did not exclude Ms. Tena in any meaningful way from
that area of her residence. [Tr., p.33, Ls.21-25; p.50, Ls.2-5.]
Based on these circumstances, the officers reasonably believed
that Ms. T ena had ready access and common control over the
Defendant's bedroom as part of her residence, and that she could
consent to a search.
Although the Defendant asserts that he was a tenant in his
parents' residence, Ms. T ena did not mention that the Defendant
paid rent or that there was a rental agreement at the time of the
search. [Tr., p.34, Ls.2-?; p.50, Ls.8-11; p.59, Ls.6-13.] There was
nothing that the officers observed at the time of the search that
would give rise to the inference that the Defendant and his parents
had a landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, even if the officers
erroneously believed Ms. Tena had authority to consent to a search
of the Defendant's bedroom, their belief was reasonable based on
the totality of the circumstances. Ms. Tena had apparent authority
to consent to the search.
(PSI, pp.5-6.)
As the district court held, regardless of whether Ms. Tena had actual
authority to consent to a search of Tena's bedroom, the facts available to the
deputies at the moment Ms. Tena consented to their entry into her house and
Tena's bedroom gave rise to a reasonable belief she that she did. In sum, the
court based its decision on testimony showing (1) the home was owned by Ms.
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Tena and her husband, (2) Ms. Tena had access to the home, (3) Tena did not
lock his bedroom door, (4) Ms. Tena did Tena's laundry and prepared his meals
and took them to Tena's bedroom because he hardly ever left the room, and (5)
there was no mention of anything suggesting Tena rented the bedroom.

Id.

Additionally, Deputy Garrett testified that when he explained to Ms. Tena
what was written on the consent and permission to search form (see State's
Exhibit 1), he told her "it was a permission to search her room - or, I mean, the
house and Santos's room[,]" and she did not seem to have any hesitation in
understanding him, and "just said yes and signed the form .... " (Tr., p.30, L.8 p.32, L.11 (emphasis added).) Therefore, after it was made clear to Ms. Tena
that the deputies intended to search Tena's bedroom, she still did not object to
that request. Deputy Bernad testified that before obtaining Ms. Tena's consent to
search her home, she told him she had to go into Tena's bedroom not only to
take him meals and do his laundry, but also to "clean." (Tr., p.50, Ls.2-5.)
Tena argues that the deputies '''lacked an objectively reasonable basis to
believe [Ms. Tena] had joint access to and mutual use of the [bedroom] without
some further inquiry.",2 (Appellant's Brief, p.10 (quoting State v. Benson, 133
Idaho 152, 158, 983 P.2d 225, 231 (Ct. App. 1999).) As a central theme of his
argument, Tena contends the record shows that when he was being led away

2 Tena's argument has consistently been that his mother lacked both actual and
apparent authority to consent to the officers' search of his bedroom. Tena did
not argue in the district court, nor does he argue on appeal, that as a (supposed)
co-tenant, he had a co-equal right to deny officers permission to enter his
bedroom, even if his mother granted such permission. See Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103 (2006); (see also R., pp.97-100, 115-118; Tr., p.62, Ls.7-23 (setting
briefing schedule in lieu of argument).) As a result, a factual record has not been
developed relevant to such a claim.
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from the house he "yelled to not let the deputies into the house or his bedroom."
(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (emphasis added); see id., p.11 ("Tena actively objected
to the deputies' entry and search of his bedroom."); p.12 ("Mr. Tena yelled to not
let the deputies into the house or his bedroom."); p.13 ("he yelled not to let the
deputies into the house or his bedroom," and "the deputies here knew that ...
Mr. Tena had objected to their entry and search of the bedroom").) Contrary to
Tena's claim, Deputy Bernad, the only state witness to testify on the subject,
explained that after Tena was handcuffed, "he started yelling not to let us in the
house as he was taken out to the car" -- without any mention of the bedroom.
(Tr., p.55, Ls.17-20.)
In repeatedly stating on appeal that he objected to officers searching his
bedroom, Tena appears to rely on the following question his trial attorney posed
to Deputy Bernad: "Where was Santos when you say he was yelling to not let
you in the house or his room?"

(Tr., p.58, Ls.2-3 (emphasis added); see

Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13.) The deputy went ahead and answered the general
call of the question of where the yelling incident took place even though the
question also improperly assumed testimony that had not been given - i.e., that
Tena yelled to not let officers in his bedroom. To the extent Tena's arguments on
appeal rely upon the inaccurate contention that he yelled that the officers not be
permitted to search his room, they fail.
Contrary to Tena's assertions on appeal, this evidence establishes that
Ms. Tena had apparent authority to consent to the search of the bedroom.
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The district court correctly concluded that the search of Tena's bedroom
was properly conducted pursuant to Ms. Tena's consent and did not violate any
of Tena's rights.

Tena's claim of error in relation to his suppression motion,

therefore, fails.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Tena's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2013.

JO~ /, C. McKINNEY

(
DeR y Attorney Genera4/'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of October, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BEN PATRICK McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

. McKinney
ty Attorney General
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